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In Re Victor B.: 
JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY 
ADJUDICATION 
ISA CIVIL 
PROCEEDING 
TO WHICH 
CRIMINAL RULES 
OF PROCEDURE 
ARE INAPPLICABLE. 
pr;c/uv'{ DEVELOPMENTS 
The distinct and sepa-
rate court system established to 
provide a simplified, informal 
setting in which to treat juvenile 
offenders was preserved by the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
in In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 
646 A.2d 1012 (1994). The 
court held that juvenile proceed-
ings are civil in nature and are 
strictly governed by their own 
set of procedural rules contained 
in Chapter 900 of the Maryland 
Rules, and where silent, not sub-
ject to appendage from the crim-
inal procedural rules from Title 
4 of the Maryland Rules. In so 
ruling, the court vacated a find-
ing of delinquency and remand-
ed the case after the juvenile 
court had overruled appellant's 
objections to the admission of 
evidence, merely because the 
appellant had not filed a pre-
adjudicatory motion to suppress 
as required in criminal proceed-
ings by Maryland Rule 4-252. 
On September 16, 1992, 
appellant, a juvenile, was ob-
served by police placing a brown 
paper bag on a Baltimore City 
street. After a police search of 
the bag revealed a substantial 
amount of cocaine, police took 
appellant into custody. Later, 
the State filed a delinquency 
petition against the appellant al-
leging one count of possession 
of cocaine and one count of 
possession of cocaine with the 
intent to manufacture and dis-
tribute. 
At an adjudicatory hear-
ing before a Master for the Di-
vision for Juvenile Causes for 
the Circuit Court of Baltimore 
City, the appellant objected to 
the introduction of evidence re-
garding the paper bag and its 
contents, claiming that the bag 
belonged to him and had not 
been abandoned. This objec-
tion was overruled by the Mas-
ter, who reasoned that because 
Chapter 900 of the Maryland 
Rules was silent as to suppres-
sion of evidence in juvenile pro-
ceedings, rules of procedure reg-
ulating suppression of evidence 
in criminal trials were applica-
ble to juvenile proceedings as 
gap-fillers. Therefore, the 
Master concluded that the ap-
pellant had waived the evidence 
admissibility issue by failing to 
make a pre-hearing motion to 
suppress as required by Mary-
land Rule 4-252. 
Appellant was subse-
quently found delinquent on the 
count of possession with intent 
to manufacture and distribute. 
Despite the appellant's filing of 
a timely exception to the Mas-
ter's recommendations, the cir-
cuit court refused to disturb the 
Master's findings. Upon ap-
peal, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted certiorari, 
prior to review by the court of 
special appeals, in order to con-
sider appellant's contention. 
On appeal, appellant ar-
gued that as Chapter 900 of the 
Maryland Rules of Procedure is 
the exclusive source for proce-
dural rules in juvenile proceed-
ings, it was error for the juvenile 
court to import Maryland Rule 
4-252 into a delinquency adju-
dication. Appellant further as-
serted that criminal rules of pro-
cedure under Title 4 can never 
apply to juvenile proceedings 
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which are civil in nature. The 
State countered that the Master 
could only look to Title 4 for 
guidance due to the complete 
absence from Chapter 900 of 
any juvenile rules dealing with 
procedures for suppression. 
The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland began its analysis by 
tracing the historical evolution 
ofthe juvenile justice system. It 
noted thatthe common law treat-
ment of juveniles over the age 
of seven as adults had disap-
peared in light of the recogni-
tion that juveniles were better 
served by rehabilitation and pro-
tection rather than punishment 
by imprisonment. In re Victor 
B., 336 Md. at 90, 646 A.2d at 
1014. This change was carried 
out by jurisdictions, exercising 
their power of parens patriae, 
by creation of a separate court 
system for juvenile offenders in 
order to provide relaxed, non-
adversarial adjudicatory hear-
ings which are civil in nature and 
deemed more suitable for reha-
bilitative purposes than criminal 
trials. Id Maryland established 
its separate juvenile court sys-
tem through the enactment of 
the Juvenile Causes Act (Cts. & 
Jud. Proc. §§ 3-801-837 (1989 
Repl. Vol. & Supp. 1993)). Id 
at 91,646 A.2d 1014-15. 
The court recognized 
that despite the intentions be-
hind the formation of separate 
juvenile court systems, delin-
quency adjudications over the 
years often "took on . . . many 
ofthe attributes of junior varsi-
ty criminal trials . . . with in-
creasinglypenalovertones." Id 
at 92,646 A.2d at 1015 (quot-
ing In re Devon T., 85Md.App. 
674 at 682-84, 584 A.2d 1287 
at 1291 (1991)). This trend led 
many courts, including the Su-
preme Court, to afford many of 
the constitutional safeguards 
guaranteed criminal defendants 
to juveniles charged with delin-
quency. Id at 91-92, 646 A.2d 
at 1015. Despite these changes, 
the court of appeals stressed 
that Maryland case law, consis-
tent with the purposes state-
ment enunciated in section 3-
802(a)(1-5) of the Juvenile 
Causes Act, in no way indicates 
that adjudications in Maryland's 
juvenile court system have been 
transformed from civil to crim-
inal in nature. Id at 93-94,646 
A.2d at 1016. 
After examining the 
background of the juvenile jus-
tice system, the court determined 
that the criminal rules of proce-
dure under Title 4 of the Mary-
land Rules are inapplicable to 
juvenile proceedings. In reach-
ing this holding, the court first 
noted that Maryland Rule I-
101, which outlines the applica-
bility of the rules, states that 
Title 2 applies to all civil matters 
with the exception of juvenile 
proceedings whose procedure 
is regulated by Rules 901 
through 922. Id at 94-95,646 
A.2d at 1016. In addition, Rule 
1-10 1 limits Title 4' s applicabil-
ity to "criminal matters." Id 
Moreover, the court observed 
that Maryland Rule 4-101 dic-
tates that "the rules in ... Title 
[4] govern procedure in all crim-
inal matters .... " Id at 95,646 
A.2d at 1016. Next, the court 
recognized that the plain mean-
ing of Rule 1-101, while solely 
excluding juvenile causes from 
Title 2' s civil rules, did not im-
plicitly indicate that criminal 
rules under Title 4 could not be 
excluded from filling in gaps in 
Chapter 900's coverage of ju-
venile procedural rules. Id at 
95,646 A.2d at 1017. 
Basing its conclusion on 
the clear and unambiguous lan-
guage of Rule 1-101 and Rule 
4-101, the court found that nei-
ther rule expressly provided that 
Title 4 applied to juvenile pro-
ceedings. Id The court empha-
sized that because juvenile pro-
ceedings are not criminal, there 
was no reason for the legislature 
to expressly exclude juvenile 
proceedings from Title 4's 
reach. Id Conversely, because 
juvenile proceedings are civil in 
nature, the court stressed that it 
was essential for the legislature 
to expressly exclude juvenile 
proceedings from Title 2's civil 
rules in order for Chapter 900 to 
solely control procedure in ju-
venile proceedings. Id The 
court further noted that its deci-
sion was in harmony with courts 
from other jurisdictions which 
have in kind shielded their juve-
nile proceedings from the appli-
cation of criminal procedural 
rules. Id at 96, 646 A.2d at 
1017. 
In Victor B., the court 
refused to allow further blurring 
of the delineations between the 
juvenile and criminal court sys-
tems by allowing criminal rules 
of procedure to have a bearing 
on delinquency adjudications. 
The court was justified in so 
holding for if often complex and 
technical rules of criminal pro-
cedure were to be introduced to 
the juvenile court system, the 
purpose behind the creation of 
Wadlow v. State: 
PROSECUTION 
IS REQUIRED TO 
PROVE BEYOND A 
REASONABLE 
DOUBT SPECIFIC 
FACTORS 
NECESSARY FOR 
IMPOSITION 
OF ENHANCED 
SENTENCE. 
the juvenile court system in pro-
viding a simplified, informal set-
ting in which to better effectu-
ate the rehabilitation and treat-
In Wadlow v. State, 335 
Md. 122, 642 A.2d 213 (1994), 
the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land formally classified enhanced 
sentencing requirements as ele-
ments of offenses which must 
be alleged and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt by the prose-
cution. The State cannot rely on 
the discretion of the trial court 
to conclude that the aggravat-
ing factors or quantity neces-
sary to elevate a particular of-
fense have been resolved. Fol-
lowing Wadlow v. State, such a 
conclusion may not be reached 
by the sentencingjudge, but must 
be determined by the trier of 
fact. 
Lauren Marie Wadlow 
was indicted by a Montgomery 
County Grand Jury for unlawful 
possession with intent to dis-
tribute (Count I), simple pos-
session (Count II), and conspir-
acyto distribute cocaine (Count 
III). The charging documents 
alleged possession of a certain 
ment of juveniles would be cir-
cumvented and thwarted. 
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quantity of cocaine sufficient to 
subject Wadlow to an enhanced 
statutory penalty for the pos-
session with intent to distribute 
charge. At trial in the Circuit 
Court for Montgomery Coun-
ty, however, the jury had not 
been instructed to determine the 
exact quantity of cocaine that 
the Defendant had possessed 
for enhancement purposes. 
Nevertheless, the jury found 
Wadlow guilty of all three 
counts. At sentencing, the sim-
ple possession count was 
merged into possession with in-
tent to distribute. Wadlow was 
then given a four year sentence 
for possession with intent to 
distribute and a consecutive one-
year sentence for the conspiracy 
charge. 
At the conclusion ofthe 
jury trial, the State filed a mo-
tion seeking to correct an illegal 
sentence, arguing that the quan-
tity of cocaine seized mandated 
imposition of a five year, no 
